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ASHLEY E. HOFMEISTER*
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.:
Resisting Expansion of Trademark Protection
in the Fashion Industry
IN Louis VuirroN MALLETIER v. DOONEY &6 BouRncE, INC.,' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to expand trademark protection in the
American fashion industry. The Second Circuit accomplished this by (1) focusing
on an already established factor for likelihood of confusion,2 (2) declining to ex-
pressly address the plaintiff's purpose for filing the lawsuit, and (3) remanding the
trademark infringement issue to a district court disinclined to favor Louis Vuitton
Malletier ("Vuitton").3
The Dooney & Bourke controversy is representative of fashion industry battles in
the United States to increase protection for fashion designs against design piracy.'
Vuitton sought to expand current trademark protection to include the "unique"
colors' it incorporated into its already protected Toile Monogram trademark.' Vuit-
ton hoped to convince the Second Circuit that unique colors incorporated into an
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2008; B.A., University of Delaware. Special
thanks to the following, without whom this Note would never have existed: RSH and MJH for supporting me
on yet another of my spontaneous escapades-law school, AMH for first suggesting I could be a lawyer, and
the Journal of Business & Technology Law staff for seeing the potential in this Note.
1. 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 117.
3. Id. at 118.
4. See The Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet
and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10-13 (2006) (testimony of Fashion
Designer Jeffrey Banks). The fashion industry, represented by the CFDA (Counsel of Fashion Designers of
America), is currently supporting The Design Piracy Act to try to expand copyright right protection to fashion
designs. Id.; see also Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (fashion designers
organized and boycotted retailers who sold pirated designs, but this organization was held illegal under anti-
trust laws by the Supreme Court).
5. Vuitton defined its Monogram Multicolore "trademark" as "a design plus color, that is, the traditional
Vuitton Toile pattern design-entwined LV initials with the three already described motifs-displayed in the 33
Murakami colors and printed on a white or black background." Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 115; see Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006) (No.
04-4941-cv). "Like the Toile Monogram, these [Multicolore] marks similarly featured a repeating diagonal
pattern of intertwined initials and shapes. This pattern was now colorized with thirty-three specially-chosen
and contrasting Murakami colors. In addition, the patterns were placed on either a white background or a
black one, instead of the original brown, creating an electric, pop-art effect." Id.
6. Vuitton's original Toile Monogram is a registered trademark. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 112.
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existing trademark are elements of that trademark and entitled to the same protec-
tion.7 Vuitton chose to pursue trademark protection because the protection offered
under copyright, patent, and trade dress laws is significantly limited.8
The Second Circuit, however, refused to consider these fashion-specific con-
cerns, and instead focused on an error by the district court concerning how to
evaluate similar marks under the likelihood of confusion doctrine.9 The court also
declined to address whether newly incorporated colors may be considered as part
of a preexisting trademark in order to receive the same protection. The Second
Circuit then remanded the issue of trademark infringement to a district court that
clearly disfavors Vuitton, and ultimately ignored the possibility of expanding trade-
mark protection in the American fashion industry.
The Second Circuit's decision leaves the American fashion industry in a precari-
ous position as the current statutes for copyright, patent, trade dress, and trade-
mark fail to protect fashion designs. Both the fashion industry and its designers
desperately need an effective way to protect their creations through the court sys-
tem because legislative laws provide minimal, if any, protection for their costly and
time-consuming designs. An expansion of trademark law to allow for the protec-
tion of colors incorporated into an existing trademark, as Vuitton requested, is a
small and fair adjustment that would have helped the American fashion industry.
The Second Circuit failed the industry by choosing to ignore this significant prob-
lem for fashion designs.
I. THE CASE
Vuitton and Dooney & Bourke, Inc. ("D & B") design and manufacture handbags
sold in the United States. 0 Vuitton is a French firm best known for its Toile Mono-
gram that consists of the entwined "LV" initials set against one of three motifs."
Vuitton registered this design pattern and the individual unique shapes as trade-
marks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2 and these trademarks
are now incontestable. 3 Vuitton updated its Toile Monogram in October 2002 by
printing the entwined "LV" initials in thirty-three bright colors on either a white or
a black background. 4 Vuitton named this new design the Louis Vuitton Toile Mon-
ogram Multicolore, 5 and it received significant attention from both the media and
7. Id. at 115; see supra note 5 (discussing Vuitton's unique colors).
8. See infra Part IV.B (discussing limitations of protection in fashion industry).
9. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 116-18.
10. Id. at 112-13.
11. Id. at 112. Louis Vuitton uses three different motifs with its Toile Monogram, including "a curved
diamond with a four-point star, its negative, and a circle with a four-leafed flower inset." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Registered trademarks used continuously for five consecutive years from registration are incontest-
able. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000).
14. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 112.
15. Id.
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celebrities. 6 By April 2004, Vuitton sold close to 70,000 Multicolore handbags and
accessories in the United States generating a net revenue of $40 million.' 7 Vuitton's
Multicolore design is not a registered trademark.'
D & B is an American company best known for its Signature and Mini Signature
handbags that consist of the "DB" initials interlocking in a repeating pattern. 9 D &
B partnered with Teen Vogue in March 2002 to develop a new line of handbags for
teenagers.2" In July 2003, D & B began manufacturing its "It-Bag" collection, which
consists of the entwined "DB" initials printed in contrasting colors on a variety of
colored backgrounds.2'
Vuitton filed suit against D & B in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on April 19, 2004 not long after the "It-Bag" intro-
duction, claiming trademark infringement, unfair competition and false designa-
tion, and trademark dilution under federal and New York state law.22
Vuitton filed this lawsuit against D & B to address the issue of "design piracy" in
the world of fashion. "Design piracy" is a term used by the fashion industry to refer
to companies or individuals who copy and reproduce someone else's designs.23 De-
sign piracy destroys a designer's motivation to be innovative by allowing a de-
signer's creation to be immediately copied, and by then causing a loss of revenue
that lessens the designer's incentive to spend the money, time, and effort needed to
be creative.24 The ultimate result is that both well-established and up-and-coming
designers suffer. The fashion giants, like Vuitton, lose the millions of dollars in-
16. Id.; see Rebecca Voight, The Message Is All in the Bag, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 2003, at 19; see also
Marcelle S. Fischler, Post- Waldbaum's, A Rival to Rodeo Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, §14LI, at 4.
17. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 112-13.
18. Id. at 116. If a trademark is unregistered, it may only receive protection under the Lanham Act if it
meets certain qualifications specified by that Act. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
19. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 113. D & B's Signature and Mini Signature collection is a registered
trademark. Id.
20. Id. Teen Vogue magazine, partnering with D & B, chose a group of female teenagers to travel to Italy
and develop a new line for D & B. Id. This group was called the "it Team," and during this trip to Italy, the
team was photographed looking at Vuitton's Multicolore handbags at a Vuitton store. Id.
21. Id. Both Vuitton's Multicolore Monogram and D & B's It-Bag use intertwining initials displayed in
bright colors set on similar colored fabrics. Id.
22. Id. Vuitton also sent a cease-and-desist letter to D & B on April 16, 2004. Id.
23. S. Priya Bharathi, Comment, There is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat: The Emergence of Trade
Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1667, 1667 (1996).
24. Id. at 1670.
Design piracy, or 'knocking off,' is a way of life in the fashion industry .... To designers, however,
knocking off is simply highway robbery. Designers invest vast amounts of time and money in design
development, only to have their designs copied by other manufacturers .... [D]esign piracy is en-
tirely legal under present law.
Id. at 1667. This sentiment is similar to Locke's Labor Theory of Property, which states:
The labor of [a man's] body, and the work of his hands . . . are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15 (5th ed. 2002); see also The Design Piracy Prohibition Act,
supra note 4, at 11.
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vested into the innovative process and advertising,25 while "design piracy [wipes]
out young careers in a single season."26
Despite design piracy's detrimental effects, it is constantly used in the fashion
industry.2 7 Because most design piracy is legal under current United States law,
cases like this one are often brought to the courts in the hope of receiving judicial
protection."
Design piracy, and more importantly, the lack of design protection in this coun-
try were the driving forces behind the Dooney & Bourke litigation. Vuitton specifi-
cally claimed trademark infringement because it knew the other forms of design
protection were inadequate to shield its new Monogram Multicolore mark.2 9 Vuit-
ton filed this lawsuit in the hopes of expanding trademark protection into a doc-
trine that could safeguard both designs and fashion industry investments."
Vuitton ultimately moved for a preliminary injunction against D & B on April
28, 2004.31 The district court found that Vuitton's Multicolore design "was an in-
herently distinctive mark that had achieved secondary meaning in the market-
place,"3 2 but "there was no likelihood of confusion between [D & B's] It-Bag pattern
and [Vuitton's] Multicolore mark."3 Accordingly, the district court denied Vuit-
ton's preliminary injunction. 4 Vuitton appealed this judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Designers and manufacturers in the American fashion industry have four possible
avenues of protection to prevent infringement or copying of their creations: copy-
25. See Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 112. "Plaintiff states that it spent over $4 million in 2003-2004
advertising and promoting the Multicolore mark and associated handbags." Id.; see also Brief of Plaintiff-Appel-
lant, supra note 5, at 9. "Louis Vuitton spent almost $6 million to ensure that its new source-identifiers were
firmly planted in the public mind." Id.
26. See The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, supra note 4, at 10-13.
So once a designer spends the thousands and thousands and gets to that runway show and then
reveals a new and original design - it can be stolen before the applause has faded thanks to digital
imagery and the internet .... The famous designer with an established and substantial business
might be able to withstand that assault, but it can absolutely derail the career of a young designer.
Id. at 12.
27. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox." Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2006).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 115.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), affd in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006)).
33. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 113.
34. Id.
35. Id. at I11.
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right protection,36 patent protection,37 trade dress protection," and trademark
protection."
A. Copyright Protection
General copyright protection is available under 17 U.S.C. § 102 for the following
categories of work: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompa-
nying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works."4 Of these categories, the only one applicable to fashion de-
signs is "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," which are statutorily defined to
include:
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied
art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article,
as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.4"
A "useful article" is statutorily defined as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information."4 In the case of clothing, as an example, § 102 copyright protection is
elusive because it is difficult to separate the utilitarian aspect (to protect a person's
skin and body) from the "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" (the colors or
design of a specific piece of clothing referred to as the "expressive" component).43
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part lI.D.
40. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2007).
41. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1699. As a further example of copyright protection limits,
consider the following:
[A] two-dimensional sketch of a fashion design is protected by copyright as a pictorial work. The
three-dimensional garment produced from that sketch, however, is ordinarily not separately pro-
tected, and copying that uses the garment as a model typically escapes copyright liability. Why? The
doctrinal answer is that the garment is a useful article, and copyright law applies only when the
article's expressive component is "separable" from its useful function.
Id.
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In other words, the design and/or colors of a dress, for instance, may not be pro-
tected under § 102 copyright law unless these designs and colors are separable from
any utilitarian function the dress may serve.4
Copyright laws also provide protection for "original designs" under 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-02." An "original design" is statutorily defined as a design that "is the
result of the designer's creative endeavor that provides a distinguishable variation
over prior work pertaining to similar articles which is more than merely trivial and
has not been copied from another source."46 These forms of copyright-protected
designs do not include any designs that are:
(1) not original;
(2) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, a familiar
symbol, an emblem, or a motif, or another shape, pattern, or configuration
which has become standard, common, prevalent, or ordinary;
(3) different from a design excluded by paragraph (2) only in insignificant
details or in elements which are variants commonly used in the relevant trades;
(4) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it; or
(5) embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer or owner
in the United States or a foreign country more than 2 years before the date of
the application for registration under this chapter.7
B. Patent Protection
Patent protection is generally available for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof" under 35 U.S.C. § 101.4" A design in the fashion industry, however,
rarely constitutes a process, 49 machine, manufacture,50 or composition of mat-
44. An example of when an expressive component is separable from the utilitarian component, and as
such protected under copyright law, is "a jeweled appliqu6 stitched onto a sweater ... because the applique is
physically separable from the garment .... I" id. at 1699-1700.
45. 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 1301-02 (LexisNexis 2004). "(a) Designs protected. (1) In general. The designer or
other owner of an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinctive in appear-
ance to the purchasing or using public may secure the protection provided by this chapter upon complying
with and subject to this chapter." Id. § 1301.
46. Id. § 1301.
47. Id. § 1302.
48. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2007).
49. A process is statutorily defined to mean a "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." Id. § 100. An example is the process for
making a specific chemical compound or drug-one would get patent protection for the steps taken to make
that compound or drug, but not for the actual compound or drug itself.
50. A machine or a manufacture deals with an invention that is structural in nature. DONALD S. CHISUM
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw 775 (3d ed. 2004). A machine usually has a moving part involved, like a
toaster for example, while a manufacture has a unique type of insulation to keep beverages warm or cold, like a
coffee mug. Id.
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ter.5 Instead, patents for designs are available under a separate statute for "any new,
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 2 A design patent,
however, "provides protection only for the ornamental features of an article of
manufacture ... and case law makes clear that features dictated by function cannot
be protected by a design patent."" As one source further notes, "design patents [do]
not extend to designs that are merely reworkings of previously existing designs."54
C. Trade Dress Protection under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, specifically section 43(a),55 provides trade dress protection to
safeguard "the design and appearance of the product as well as that of the container
and all elements making up the total visual image by which the product is
presented to customers." 6 It should be noted, however, that in a suit "for trade
dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the princi-
pal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of prov-
ing that the matter sought to be protected is not functional." The United States
Supreme Court clarified this requirement by holding that "a product feature is
functional ... if it ... affects the cost or quality of the article, that is, if exclusive
use of the feature would put competitors at a significant disadvantage.""8 As one
scholar explains, "courts have adopted a market-based definition of functionality.
According to this view, a product or feature is deemed functional if it is something
that would be difficult for competitors to do without."59
51. A composition of matter deals with an invention or a discovery that is chemical in nature. Id. at 775.
"A composition of matter may be a new compound ... or a new combination of existing and/or new com-
pounds." Id.
52. 35 U.S.C.A. § 171.
53. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 50, at 225.
54. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1704-05.
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 2007).
56. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir. 1995). An example of trade dress protec-
tion is when the United States Supreme Court protected a Mexican restaurant's claimed trade dress, which
consisted of:
[A] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright
colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio
capable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of
the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright
awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992) (quoting Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 505 U.S. 763 (1992)).
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(3). The phrase, "trade dress not registered on the principal register," refers to an
unregistered trade dress like Vuitton's Multicolor Monogram handbags, which have not been officially regis-
tered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id.; see infra note 64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office).
58. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
59. James E. Stewart & J. Michael Huget, Trade Dress: Protecting a Valuable Asset, 74 MICH. B.J. 56, 57
(1995).
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In addition, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the colors and
designs of a product, which constitute aspects of trade dress, are only protected
under the Lanham Act upon a showing of secondary meaning.6" Secondary mean-
ing requires that customers come to associate that specific color or design with the
source of a particular product over time."
D. Trademark Protection under the Lanham Act
A trademark is statutorily defined as
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.62
Trademark protection is available under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Together, these sections protect both registered and unregistered trademarks from
misuse or reproduction in commerce.63 Section 32 protects those trademarks that
are registered on the Principal Register with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office.' Section 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks by provid-
ing that an entity's
us[e] in commerce [oj any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any com-
bination thereof... which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to. . . origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
60. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212, 216 (2000). "We hold that, in an action
for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is distinctive,
and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning." Id.
61. Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1008; see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
63. Id. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
64. Section 32 states that:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1114. See generally United States Patent and Trademark Office: Trademarks, http://www.
uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
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or commercial activities... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.6"
To determine whether an unregistered trademark qualifies for protection under
this provision of the Lanham Act, the United States Supreme Court held "that the
general principles qualifying a mark for registration under §2 of the Lanham Act
are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is
entitled to protection under §43(a)."66 Section 2 of the Lanham Act states: "No
trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it" falls under one of six exceptions listed within that statute.
67
According to the United States Supreme Court, this means that the unregistered
trademark must be either inherently distinctive or possess secondary meaning in
order to receive protection under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.6 The Second
Circuit elaborated on this requirement in Star Industries, Inc. v. Barcardi & Co., by
stating
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
66. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
67. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052. The six statutory exceptions are as follows:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may dispar-
age or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used
on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods ....
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any
State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof;
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual
except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the
United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow;
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive: Provided, That if the Director determines that confu-
sion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of
the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the
marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations
may be issued ....
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of re-
gional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title, (3) when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4) is
primarily merely a surname, or (5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional;
(f) Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5) of this section,
nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce ....
Id.
68. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768.
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a mark must be sufficiently "distinctive" to distinguish the registrant's goods
from those of others. Such distinctiveness may be demonstrated in either of two
ways. The mark may be "inherently distinctive" if its intrinsic nature serves to
identify its particular source. Alternatively... the mark may be distinctive by
virtue of having acquired a "secondary meaning" in the minds of consumers.69
A trademark, as noted above, is inherently distinctive when its nature, usually ei-
ther words or specific packaging of a product, immediately identify its particular
source. As an example, "marks that are 'arbitrary' ('Camel' cigarettes), 'fanciful'
('Kodak' film), or 'suggestive' ('Tide' laundry detergent) are held to be inherently
distinctive."0 A trademark acquires secondary meaning, on the other hand, "when,
'in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself." 7 Examples of items that
often need to acquire secondary meaning for protection under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act include colors or designs of the item to be trademarked.72
Once a trademark is found either to be inherently distinctive or to have acquired
secondary meaning, and as such protected under the Lanham Act, the issue of
trademark infringement is then addressed under the standard of likelihood of con-
fusion.73 While there is no ruling from the United States Supreme Court on how to
determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the individual circuits each
created their own list of factors for making this determination.74 In the Second
Circuit, a series of non-exclusive factors, known as the Polaroid factors,75 comprise
the likelihood of confusion test for trademark infringement. 76 These factors include
(1) the strength of the mark, (2) the similarity between the marks, (3) the proxim-
ity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap between
69. 412 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1019 (2006).
70. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
71. Id. at 211 (quoting to Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)); see supra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning).
72. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212.
73. The test to determine whether a trademark is protected from trademark infringement under the Lan-
ham Act is a two-part analysis: "The plaintiff must provide factual proof that: (1) either secondary meaning or
inherent distinctiveness has been acquired by the trade dress [or trademark]; and (2) that the defendant's
product is 'confusingly similar' to the plaintiffs product." Gruner + Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991
F.2d 1072, 1074 (2d Cir. 1993).
74. See generally Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2006); Freedom Card,
Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2005); Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901,
903 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2303 (2006); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d
477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2004); Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2004); Sally Beauty Co. v.
Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002); Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship
Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir.
1988); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
75. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820
(1961).
76. See id. "Even [the] extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities-the court may have to take
still other variables into account." Id.
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the markets of the two marks, (5) actual confusion, (6) the defendant's good faith
in using his or her mark, (7) the quality of the defendant's product, and (8) the
sophistication of the consumers.77
The second factor, the similarity of the two trademarks, is especially important
to any likelihood of confusion analysis,7" and is evaluated in most Circuits through
a sequential, marketplace comparison.79 For the Second Circuit, this comparison
developed through a series of cases,"° which includes a 2000 holding that the fact
finder must "appraise the overall impression created by ... the context in which
[the marks] are found and consider the totality of factors that could cause confu-
sion among prospective purchasers" in evaluating the similarities between two
trademarks.8 ' The court affirmed this rationale in 2004, holding that "[b]ecause the
ultimate issue is the likelihood of confusion, analysis focuses on the particular in-
dustry where the marks compete."82
Then, in a 2005 decision by the Second Circuit, Malletier v. Burlington Coat
Factory,3 the court once again addressed how lower courts must evaluate the simi-
larity of trademarks when determining likelihood of confusion. 4 In that case, Louis
Vuitton Malletier sued Burlington Coat Factory claiming trademark infringement
by Burlington of its Louis Vuitton Monogram Multicolore Design. 5 The Second
Circuit explicitly held that "courts must analyze the mark's overall impression on a
consumer, considering the context in which the marks are displayed and 'the total-
77. Id.; see Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe issue is whether,
on balance, the factors establish a likelihood of confusion."); see also Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d
373, 390-91 (2d Cir. 2005) (balancing the Polaroid factors), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1019 (2006).
78. Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 537 (2d Cir. 2005).
79. All federal circuit courts of appeal appear to use a sequential, marketplace comparison to determine a
similarity of marks in a likelihood of confusion determination. See, e.g., Davis, 430 F.3d at 904 (noting that
while marks were identical, they were used in very different manners and in very different markets); Scott
Fetzer, 381 F.3d at 485 ("[W]e must 'consider the marks in the context that a customer perceives them in the
marketplace, which includes their presentation in advertisements.'"); Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib.,
LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1208 (1lth Cir. 2004) (quoting AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1541) ("[A] court may not view [a
mark] in a vacuum. Rather, a court must consider how the [mark] would function in the actual market
place."), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1054 (2005); Winship Green, 103 F.3d at 20 (stating that "any meaningful inquiry
into the likelihood of confusion necessarily must replicate the circumstances in which the ordinary consumer
actually confronts ... the conflicting mark").
80. Lang v. Ret. Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 581 (2d Cir. 1991). "In making this determination, a
court should look at the general impression created by the marks, taking into account all factors that potential
purchasers will likely perceive and remember." Id.; see also Gruner + Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991
F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1993). "In assessing similarity, courts look to the overall impression created by the
logos and the context in which they are found and consider the totality of factors that could cause confusion
among prospective purchasers." Id.
81. Nabisco, 220 F.3d at 47 (quoting Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 744 (2d Cir.
1998)).
82. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC, 360 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
83. 426 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2005).
84. Id. at 534.
85. Id. at 534, 536. It should be noted that this is the same Vuitton trademark in question in the case at
hand. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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ity of factors that could cause confusion among prospective purchasers."6 As the
court in that case noted, "[t]hough two products may be readily differentiated
when carefully viewed simultaneously, those same products may still be confus-
ingly similar in the eyes of ordinary consumers encountering the products individ-
ually under typical purchasing conditions ..8.7."" Thus, there is an established
Second Circuit legal precedent for the evaluation of likelihood of confusion in rela-
tion to trademark infringement, as well as the similarity of marks factor in deter-
mining likelihood of confusion.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
Circuit Judge Cardamone wrote for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit"8 in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., establishing
four separate holdings 9 that addressed (1) the proper burden for a preliminary
injunction;' (2) the type of trademark entitled to protection;9 (3) the proper test
for determining the likelihood of confusion;92 and (4) the burden that must be met
for a trademark dilution claim." The Second Circuit agreed with the district court
that Vuitton's Multicolore mark deserved protection,94 but vacated the district
court's decision to utilize a side-by-side comparison to determine similarity of the
marks.95 The Second Circuit also vacated the district court's decision concerning
the proper burden for a preliminary injunction,96 but agreed with the district court
that Vuitton failed to prove trademark dilution.97
86. Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 537 (quoting Gruner + Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991
F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cit. 1993)).
87. Id. at 539.
88. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2006). Circuit Judge
Richard J. Cardamone was joined on the panel by Judge Joseph M. McLaughlin and Judge Rosemary S. Pooler.
89. Id. at 112.
90. Id. at 114.
91. Id. at 116.
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 119.
94. Id. at 116; see supra notes 60-61, 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning and
inherent distinctiveness). The Second Circuit agreed with the district court, and found that Vuitton's Mul-
ticolore trademark was inherently distinctive and consumers acquired a secondary meaning for this trademark.
Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 116. As such, Vuitton's Multicolore mark deserved protection under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
95. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 118.
96. Id. at 114.
97. Id. at 119. The Second Circuit explained that to establish a dilution claim under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1125(c) (West 2000), Vuitton must demonstrate that: "(1) its mark is famous; (2)
the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the
mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing
the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services." Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 118
(quoting Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 448-49 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 (2005)).
There also must be a demonstration of actual dilution, in addition to the above four factors, not just a likeli-
hood of dilution. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 422, 434 (2003). While the panel assumed
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Of the four holdings in this case, the Second Circuit focused its opinion on the
proper standard to determine whether the similarity between the parties' marks
amounted to likelihood of confusion." The court, relying on its holding in Burling-
ton Coat Factory,99 stated that "courts must analyze the mark's overall impression
on a consumer, considering the context in which the marks are displayed and the
totality of factors that could cause confusion among prospective purchasers" to
determine similarity of the marks for likelihood of confusion."° The court found
that the district court improperly relied on a side-by-side comparison'' to deter-
mine the similarity of Vuitton's and D & B's trademarks, rather than using a se-
quential, marketplace comparison,0 2 and remanded the issue to the district
court. 03
Importantly, the Second Circuit remanded only the similarity of the marks fac-
tor ' 4 for reconsideration by the district court."5 The court held that while the
district court erred in determining this likelihood of confusion factor, by utilizing a
side-by-side comparison,"6 the district court had not "clearly erred with respect to
the other Polaroid factors."'0 7 As a result, the Second Circuit only compelled the
district court to reanalyze the similarity of Vuitton's and D & B's marks under the
sequential, marketplace comparison, and to then rebalance all of the Polaroid fac-
tors relevant to this case.'
IV. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit used Dooney & Bourke to make a subtle but powerful statement
about protection for fashion designs, including colors, under the Lanham Act.
While the court devoted much of its opinion to a sequential, marketplace compari-
son for determining similarity of marks,0 9 as though this was a novel con-
Vuitton would be able to show the first three factors, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
"Vitton has not offered any evidence of actual dilution." Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 119.
98. Id.
99. Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2005).
100. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 117.
101. Id. The Court re-emphasized, as it had in Burlington Coat Factory, that a side-by-side comparison can
be a useful tool to determine the similarities and differences between two trademarks, as long as the focus
continues to remain on "likelihood of confusion" in the marketplace. Id. (discussing Burlington Coat Factory,
426 F.3d at 538).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 118.
104. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820
(1961). "Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of many variables
... [including] the degree of similarity between the two marks ... ." Id.
105. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 117-18.
106. Id. at 117.
107. Id. at 118.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 116-18.
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cept,""° the court's true holding was an implicit refusal to expand trademark protec-
tion in the American fashion industry."' The Second Circuit's refusal is evident
through its failure to address Vuitton's fashion industry concerns" 2 and its decision
to remand only one factor in the trademark infringement calculus to an already
predisposed district court.' Unfortunately for Vuitton and other fashion design-
ers, the Second Circuit is unwilling to offer the necessary trademark protection for
fashion designs, despite the unavailability of protection from other sources.
A. The Court Implicitly Refused to Expand Trademark Protection in the American
Fashion Industry by Overly Focusing on a Legally Established Comparison for
a Likelihood of Confusion Factor.
While the Second Circuit dutifully performed its job by once again affirming a
sequential, marketplace comparison as the proper standard for evaluating similarity
of marks for a likelihood of confusion determination," 4 the court missed a golden
opportunity to assist designers and manufacturers in the American fashion indus-
try. One would think the Second Circuit's likelihood of confusion holding in this
case was innovative, as the court devoted almost half of its nearly ten-page opinion
to this topic."5 The truth, however, is the court could have easily dispatched this
issue, as there is established legal precedent for it, and then used the bulk of its
opinion to address the important concerns of Vuitton and the fashion industry."
6
The Second Circuit's avoidance of Vuitton's fashion industry concerns is further
evidenced by the fact that a few months before this case, the Second Circuit heard
arguments on the same issue of likelihood of confusion from Vuitton and Burling-
ton Coat Factory."7 As such, the Second Circuit's overly focused opinion in Dooney
& Bourke on this matter was duplicative and unnecessary. The disappointing reality
of Dooney & Bourke is that the Second Circuit's concentration on the proper stan-
dard for evaluating similarity of marks in a likelihood of confusion determination
merely masked the court's deliberate evasion of the fashion-specific issues raised by
Vuitton and the need to address a hole in design-protection legislation.
110. The Second Circuit and most other circuits already have held that a sequential, marketplace compari-
son is the proper standard for evaluating the similarity of marks for likelihood of confusion. See supra notes
79-87 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part V.A.
112. See infra Part IV.B.
113. See infra Part IV.C; see also Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 118.
114. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's prior decisions on
similarity of marks for a likelihood of confusion determination).
115. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 111-20.
116. See infra Part V.B.
117. Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2005). Burlington Coat
Factory was argued on March 2, 2005, and decided on October 12, 2005. Id. Dooney & Bourke was argued on
September 9, 2005, and decided on June 30, 2006. 454 F.3d 108; see also Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at
534, 538-39 (discussing the proper standard for evaluation of similarity of mark in a likelihood of confusion
determination).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW200
ASHLEY E. HOFMEISTER
B. The Court Implicitly Refused to Expand Trademark Protection in the American
Fashion Industry by Declining to Expressly Address Vuitton's Purpose for
Filing this Lawsuit.
Vuitton filed this lawsuit against D & B to address the issue of "design piracy" in the
world of fashion." ' Copyright, patent, and trade dress law do not provide protec-
tion from design piracy. However, protection from design piracy may be available
under trademark law. By failing to address the possibility of trademark protection
from design piracy, the court implicitly refused to expand protection for the fash-
ion industry and declined to expressly address Vuitton's purpose for filing this
lawsuit.
Copyright law provides no design protection to Vuitton or other fashion design-
ers under either 17 U.S.C. § 102 or §§ 1301-02. The general protection offered by
17 U.S.C. § 102 to a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work is only extended to a
design whose "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features ... can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article." "' In fashion, it is almost always impossible to separate the expressive
components (which may be copyrighted) from the utilitarian components (which
may not be copyrighted) as required by this statute. 21 In Vuitton's case, there is no
method to separate the unique colors incorporated into Vuitton's preexisting Toile
Monogram trademark 2' from the rest of the handbag. The colored "LV" initials
entwined on the surface of the handbag also are entwined with the other aspects of
the handbag, including the sturdy material used to allow the article to functionally
hold personal items.
As for copyright protection offered under 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-02, the "originality"
requirement is problematic because it excludes all standard, familiar, or common-
place figures, emblems, symbols, and motifs, along with all designs that differ "only
in insignificant details or elements which are variants commonly used in the rele-
vant trades." 22 Vuitton's Monogram Multicolore design consists of letters in differ-
ent colors on either a white or a black background. 23 While Vuitton would argue
otherwise, a copyright examiner could conclude that the colored letters are stan-
dard symbols or figures, or insignificant variations within the fashion industry.
Thus, copyright protection, if ever available to fashion designers, is difficult to ob-
tain and available in a very limited manner.
Patent law, likewise, offers no protection for Vuitton's Monogram Multicolore
design. Even without specifically examining Vuitton's design, the patent process is
118. See supra Part I.
119. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2007).
120. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing how it is difficult under copyright law to
protect clothing).
121. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Vuitton's unique colors).
122. 17 U.S.C.S. § 1302 (LexisNexis 2004).
123. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006).
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insufficient for fashion for two central reasons. First, patents are only issued to
"new, original, and ornamental" designs, which do not include re-workings or the
slight variations in design that the fashion industry considers to be new.'24 Here,
like with copyright law, Vuitton's colored letters may not be seen as original, but
rather as a re-working of the prior use of initials in handbag design. The second
reason is that the patent process simply takes too long for the fashion industry.
125
Vuitton released its Monogram Multicolore design in October 2002, and by July
2003, less than a year later, D & B had released its allegedly infringing "It-Bag"
collection.' 26 There was simply no time to seek patent law protection.
Trade dress protection, likewise, provides no refuge to Vuitton's Monogram Mul-
ticolore design. While Vuitton amazingly established secondary meaning for its de-
sign in the minds of its consumers, 12 which is a fairly significant challenge in the
fashion industry,'28 it would still not pass the "not functional" prerequisite required
under the Lanham Act.'2 9
For example, the use of a color to make a product more desirable to a consumer
is a functional use of that color, and that color would not be entitled to trade dress
protection. 13 Vuitton arguably used its unique colors to make its handbags more
desirable to its consumers, which indicates that the colors incorporated into its
original Toile Monogram trademark are probably functional. Moreover, protecting
the trade dress use of these thirty-three colors against a white or black background
could be perceived as hindering competition in the relevant market by preventing
other competitors from using multicolored symbols on either a white or black
background. As such, this would cause Vuitton's Monogram Multicolore mark to
fall under the definition of "functionality."
3
'
124. 35 U.S.C.A. § 171 (West 2000); see Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1704 (noting that "design
patents... [do] not extend to designs that are merely reworkings of previously existing designs.... [bjecause
so many apparel designs are reworkings and are not 'new' in the sense that the patent law requires, most will
not qualify for design patent protection").
125. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1704. "[T]he waiting period [is] lengthy (more than eighteen
months, on average, for design patents), and the prospects of protection uncertain .... " Id.
126. Dooney 6 Bourke, 454 F.3d at 112-13.
127. See id. at 116 (holding that Vuitton's Multicolore design possessed both secondary meaning and inher-
ent distinctiveness); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that Vuitton's Multicolore design possessed both secondary meaning and inherent
distinctiveness), affd in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006).
128. Bharathi, supra note 23, at 1691. "Since the 'style life' of a garment is usually not more than three
months, secondary meaning is difficult to prove.... In a rapidly changing industry, where trends arise almost
every season, the length of time required to establish secondary meaning is unlikely to be met." Id.
129. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(3) (West 2007).
130. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
131. The lower court in this case was concerned that allowing Vuitton to prevail on its trademark claims
" ould grant Louis Vuitton monopoly rights over a 'look'-a multicolored monogram against a white or black
background." Louis Vuitton Malletier, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21. The underlying problem is that a success for
Vuitton would mean that other competing handbag designers would be unable to colorize their own trade-
marked logos and place these logos on a white or black background. Moreover, a decision for Vuitton would
give exclusive rights over this "design" to a manufacturer with a substantial amount of market share in the
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In the fashion industry, however, this worry is misplaced and unfounded due in
part to trade dress legislation's failure to consider the nature of fashion trends.
Fashion designs and trends change seasonally, and what is in high demand by con-
sumers one month changes drastically throughout a single fiscal year.'32 Thus,
while allowing Vuitton to protect its unique colors under trade dress law may give
them a slight edge temporarily, the edge will not last long in the world of fashion.
Regardless of this truth, trade dress protection provides no shelter for Vuitton's
newest creation.
Without the protection of copyright, patent, or trade dress laws, Vuitton pursued
this lawsuit under trademark law in the hope of convincing the Second Circuit that
the newly incorporated colors were an element of its already protected Toile Mono-
gram trademark. 3' As the Second Circuit noted, "Vuitton does not seek to protect
the overall look of its handbags, that is, its trade dress, but rather the narrower
trademark it has established in its colored pattern."'34 Vuitton's intent was to
visibly integrate a trademark to an extent that the mark becomes an element of
the design. Burberry's distinctive plaid is trademarked, for example, and many
of Burberry's garments and accessories incorporate this plaid into the design.
• . . For these goods, the logo is part of the design, and thus trademark
provides significant protection against design copying."'
The Second Circuit, however, refused to expressly hold whether Vuitton's Mono-
gram Multicolore design qualified to receive protection as a trademark. Further-
more, the court failed to address or discuss the fashion industry and the lack of
protection for fashion designs, even though these issues were motivating factors
higher-end handbag industry. This may also raise antitrust issues under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits entities from "monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspirling with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations . . . ." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
132. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1705 (noting that "[gliven the short shelf-life of many
fashion designs, the design patent is simply too slow and uncertain to be relevant"); see also Lennie Bennett,
Lukewarm Coco, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 5, 2005, at 8E ("A point the exhibition makes-and that all
dealing with fashion make-is its fleeting nature."); Melissa Maynard, The Fast-Moving Fashion World Leaves
Little Time for Signature Style, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 12, 2005, at 4 ("Fashion's fleeting nature barely gives us time
to find a current style we want .... ").
133. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 420. This is supported by Vuitton's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, which requested the district court to enjoin Dooney & Bourke from "using in any way any of
the Louis Vuitton Trademarks, including the Louis Vuitton Toile Monogram Multicolore Trademarks, for] any
designation or design so similar as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception with . . . the Louis
Vuitton Trademarks." Id. (emphasis added).
134. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006). "Like the Toile
Monogram, these [Multicolore] marks similarly featured a repeating diagonal pattern of intertwined initials
and shapes. This pattern was now colorized with thirty-three specially-chosen and contrasting Murakami col-
ors. In addition, the patterns were placed on either a white background or a black one, instead of the original
brown, creating an electric, pop-art effect." See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 5, at 7.
135. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 27, at 1701.
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behind this lawsuit.'36 Instead, the Second Circuit remanded the issue of trademark
infringement to the district court, and unlike the lower court,'37 failed to mention
the fashion industry background of this case 3' or the hardships facing fashion de-
signers in protecting their creations.
C. The Court Implicitly Refused to Expand Trademark Protection in the American
Fashion Industry by Remanding the Trademark Infringement Issue to a
District Court Disinclined to Favor Vuitton.
The Second Circuit remanded the issue of trademark infringement with knowledge
that the district court was likely to find against Vuitton. Specifically, the court knew
from the record that the district court found a majority of the Polaroid factors in
favor of D & B." ' The Second Circuit also knew that the district court believed that
a balancing of the Polaroid factors did not support a finding of likelihood of confu-
sion. 40 Finally, the court knew that the district court believed that "[i] f Louis Vuit-
ton succeed[ed], then it [would] have used the law to achieve an unwarranted
anticompetitive result"'' and "it would grant Louis Vuitton monopoly rights over a
'look'-a multicolored monogram against a white or black background."'1
42
Thus, the Second Circuit's decision to remand the issue of trademark infringe-
ment to the district court appears to be an implicit refusal by the court to expand
trademark protection in the American fashion industry. After all, the court re-
136. While the lower court in this case did not favor Vuitton's request for fashion design protection, the
district court at least addressed the fashion industry setting of this case. In fact, district Judge Scheindlin
opened the case by stating that "[tihis case involves the Court in the world of haute couture, where Louis
Vuitton Malletier, armed with state and federal trademark law, seeks to prevent Dooney & Bourke, Inc-and
all others-from trespassing in what it perceives as its fashion 'territory.'" Louis Vuitton Malletier, 340 F. Supp.
2d at 419-20. The district court then spent the following two pages discussing the general facts of this case
against the background of the fashion industry. Id. at 420-22.
137. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the Second Circuit's failure to directly address Vuitton's fashion-spe-
cific concerns).
138. Dooney & Bourke, 454 F.3d at 118. "We do not believe the district court clearly erred with respect to
the other Polaroid factors." Id. (emphasis added).
139. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 340 F. Supp. 2d. at 441-47. Specifically, the district court found there was no
evidence of actual confusion (Factor 5: Existence of Actual Confusion), that customers who shop for [expen-
sive] products in high-end department stores are usually discriminating customers (Factor 6: Sophistication of
Consumers), that there was no proof that Dooney & Bourke acted with bad faith (Factor 7: Bad Faith), and
that the quality of the defendant's product was neutral (Factor 8: Quality of Product). Id. It is also reasonable
to believe that, even after a reanalysis of the "similarity of the marks" factor under the sequential, marketplace
comparison, the district court still will maintain that there is not a sufficient degree of similarity between the
marks. This is especially possible as the district court believes the consumers of these bags to be sophisticated
enough to differentiate between the "LV" initials on Vuitton's bags and the "DB" initials on Dooney & Bourke's
bags. Id. at 446.
140. Id. at 447. "According each of the factors its proper weight, it is quite clear that Louis Vuitton has not
demonstrated that there is a likelihood of confusion ... among consumers as to the source, authorization, or
affiliation of Dooney & Bourke's handbags." Id.
141. Id. at 420.
142. Id. at 421; see supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining why the district court's arguments are
arguably incorrect).
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manded this issue to a district court it knows disfavors Vuitton. The Second Cir-
cuit, moreover, only criticized the district court's initial finding concerning how the
similarity of two marks was to be determined. As such, it is reasonable and logical
to believe that Vuitton will lose its trademark infringement claim upon remand, as
there is only one likelihood of confusion factor to reconsider, and thus federal
courts will continue to limit trademark protection in ways detrimental to fashion
innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision by the Second Circuit in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke,
Inc. represents a refusal to offer necessary protection to designs in the American
fashion industry. Vuitton, unable to shield its Monogram Multicolore design under
copyright, patent, or trade dress protection, attempted to convince the Second Cir-
cuit that its newest design was an element of its original Toile Monogram trade-
mark so that it could receive protection under trademark laws. The court in this
case, however, implicitly refused to expand trademark protection to include the use
of colors and background colors as elements of Vuitton's trademark, and the fash-
ion industry is once again left with minimal protection for its designs.
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